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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
REAL PROPERTY-CONVEYANCE TO HUSBAND AND WIFE AND
THIRD PERSON-USE OF WORDS "HIS WIFE"
In the absence of evidence of intention does the presumption that an estate
by the entireties is created when the conveyance is solely to husband and wife also
apply to a conveyance to a husband and wife together with third parties?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was recently faced with this problem in the
case of Heatter v. Lucas.' There land was conveyed to "Frances Lucas, a single
man, and Joseph Lucas and Matilda Lucas, his wife." There was no indication
in the deed of what share was intended to pass to each of the grantees, the habendum
clause providing, "To Have and to Hold the same unto and for the use of the
said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns forever."
The court through CHIDSEY, J. laying particular stress on the fact that the
words "his wife" were used in the deed, held that Matilda Lucas and Joseph Lucas
became owners of a one-half interest in the property as tenants by the entireties,
and that Frances took an undivided one-half interest in the property conveyed.
The court's conclusion was in harmony with common law principles.
"Where real property is conveyed or devised to a husband and wife and a third
person ... the husband and wife being but one person in law will together take
only an undivided moiety or half the estate, leaving the other half to the third
person ... as between themselves husband and wife are tenants by the entireties
2
of their share, but as to the third person they are together a joint tenant with him.
The husband and wife not only take an entire estate as one person, when it is granted to them, but they are also regarded as one person in any conveyance made to them
and others and, therefore, take but one undivided share. Thus, in a grant by way
of joint tenancy to three persons each takes a one-third part. In a grant to husband
and wife and third person, the husband and wife take one-half and the other person
takes the other half 3 ... and it has been held that when land is conveyed to husband
and wife and a third person with the habendum 'expressly to hold as tenants in
common, that the third person takes one moiety and the husband and wife a moiety,
and not each a one-third part as tenants in common. 4
1 367 Pa. 296; 80 A.2d 749 (1951).
2 30 C. J. § 95(g) p. 564; 26 AM. JtJR. § 74 p. 700; 41 C.J.S. § 31(f) p. 454; 1 Coke on
Littleton (1827) § 291. 187 p. 853; Coke on Littleton 1. 188a; Johnson v. Hart 6 W. and S. 319
(1843). See Act of 1812 P.L. 259, 5 Sm. L. 395 § 1, 20 P.S. 121 abolishing the incident of survivorship in joint tenancies although not preventing the creation of such incident.
8 13 R.C.L. § 126 p. 1103.
4 In Johnson v. Hart, (n. 2), the court construed a deed which read; "to Hannah Speakman and
John Hart and Lydia his wife and to their heirs and assigns as tenants in common and not as joint
tenants. The court held that Hannah Speakman took one moiety of the estate and that Hart and his wife
took the other moiety notwithstanding the fact that the habendum was to them as tenants in common
and not as joint tenants.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 56

So in a case of a conveyance or devise to husband and wife and a third person
the husband and wife as a unity are tenants in common or joint tenants as the
case may be with respect to the other co-tenants, but as between themselves they
hold their undivided share as tenants by the entireties. 5 At common law before the
passage of the Married Women's Property Acts6 because of marital unity husband
and wife could take property devised or conveyed to them in no other way than as
tenants by the entireties, regardless of intention, provided that certain requisites were
met. It was necessary that the parties be husband and wife and that the conveyance
was made under circumstances involving unity of time, title, interest, and possession.7 This was true despite the loosely worded statement in In Re Estate of Mary
Vandergrift8 that "The Common Law rule was that a conveyance to a husband and
wife is presumed to create an estate by the enti-eties."
Since the Married Women's Property Acts the rule has not been modified. 9

The Pennsylvania courts held that in a conveyance or devise to husband and wife
and a third person the husband and wife still took the property as tenants by the
entireties unless a contrary intention appeared. 10 The Lucas case hold, however,
that it is not necessary to consider the effect of the Married Women's Property Acts,
but that "intention is the cardinal and controlling element."
The Pennsylvania cases on the point show that due to marital unity at common
law husband and wife could only take as tenants by the entireties. This fiction of
marital unity was abrogated to some extent by the Married Women's Property
Act of 1848.

What is the rule in Pennsylvania today where the facts resolve such an
issue as we are here considering?
There can be but two conclusions since the Act of 1848:
(1) It must now be affirmatively indicated just what interest a
husband and wife take when a conveyance is made to them together with a third person; or
(2) A presumption exists that husband and wife take as tenants by
the entireties but they may now take as tenants in common or
as joint tenants between themselves. (Which would seem to be
the reasonable conclusion.)
The dictum in this case supports the first conclusion. It denotes a complete
swinging back of the pendulum, and such a conclusion is not consistent with changes
brought about by the Married Women's Property Acts.
5 n. 3.
6 Beginning with the Act of 1848 P.L. 536, 12 P.S. 64.
7 Johnson v. Hart 6 W. and S. 319 (1843).
8 105 Pa. Super. 293 (296), 161 A. 898, 899 (1932).
9 30 C.J.S. § 95(g) p. 564 n. 46a.
10 n. 8; 367 Pa. 296, 80 A.2d 749 (1951) n. 2; see also Klienschmidt Estate wherein no reference
to the marital status was made and the conveyance was to husband and wife and a third person as
joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common thereby indicating that the
parties were not to take as tenants by the entireties. 362 Pa. 353 (358).
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It would appear that from henceforth in Pennsylvania you must affirmatively
show in the deed that husband and wife are:
(1) Tenants in Common
(2) Joint Tenants
(3) Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship"
(4) Tenants by the entireties, or add the words his wife to the
wife's name and separate husband and wife from the third
person's name by the conjunction "and."
It is submitted that it is more consistent to say that where a conveyance is made
to husband and wife and a third person that if all the other requisites are present,
supra, then it shall be presumed that husband and wife take a moiety together as
tenants by the entireties unless a contrary intention appears. Any other rule makes
the construction of a deed depend on whether superfluous words denoting marital
status are used and is apt to result in confusion.
This reference to marital status was not necessary under the common law
before or after the Married Women's Property Acts where a third person was not
concerned and the court gives no other reason for its conclusion in this case than
that intention should be the cardinal and controlling element. This, as has been
noted, is a great departure from the original principle. It would seem that a presumption in Pennsylvania has been replaced by a rule of affirmative intention.
William F. Higie

BAILMENT-PARKING LOT OWNER'S DUTY OF CARE OF BAILED
PROPERTY-DELEGABILITY OF DUTY-THEORIES OF LIABILITY
An employee of the defendant's parking lot wrecked the plaintiff's car while
driving in the city of Philadelphia. The employee was acting neither within the scope
of his authority nor with the consent of the plaintiff, the owner of the automobile.
When he delivered the car to the parking lot, plaintiff had paid the required
consideration and had received the customary receipt.
With these facts before it in the case of Metzger v. Downtown GarageCorp.,'
the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently affirmed the judgment of Muncipal Court
of the County of Philadelphia, allowing recovery for the plaintiff.
Being in assumpsit, plaintiff's action was based upon a breach of a contractual
obligation of the parking lot owner arising from his implied promise to take reasonable and ordinary care of plaintiff's car.
11 See Act of 1812 P.L. 259, 5 Sm. L. 395 § 1, 20 P.S. 121, n. 3.
1 169 Pa. Super. 384, 82 A.2d 507, (July 19,

1951).
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All the authorities2 cited by Judge Arnold, author of the opinion, seem to
back up the holding of the present case. In effect, each authority sets forth as the
majority view today the doctrine that a master cannot escape responsibility for
his own contractual obligation merely because the servant breached those duties,
rather than the master himself. Two of them, Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc.3 and 6
Am. lur., Bailments, § 266, go beyond this and apparently extend similar liability
into the tort field.
Relying on the doctrine of respondeatsuperior, defendant argued that a master
is not liable for the acts of his servant outside the scope of his employment. He cited
many Pennsylvania cases upholding this proposition. The court, however, distinguished defendant's authorities on the grounds that they involved "damages to persons with whom the defendant had no contract" and that "the question in those
cases was whether the defendant was liable for the negligence of his employee under
the doctrine of respondeat superior." The court in its reasoning clearly points
out that any defense based on the doctrine of respondeatsuperioris not applicable in
an action founded on contract.
Defendant also disputed the lower court's decision because it was based on
Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc. 4 The Jackson case, counsel for defendant argued,
was incorrectly decided although it did involve similar facts.
The author of that opinion, the same Judge Arnold, stated there that "...
if
the defendant became a bailee for hire under a valid contract, 5 it (the defendant
corporation) was bound to exercise all reasonable and ordinary care to prevent
injury to the subject matter. A bailee cannot by transferring this duty to a servant
or agent, relieve itself from responsibility for its proper exercise. The bailee cannot receive money for the performance of a duty and at the same time shift the responsibility to a servant, and thus be relieved from liability for violation of the
very duties attending the bailment." This quotation was repeated in the present
case. Jackson had sued in trespass under a tort theory, but the court did not note
the difference in this recent opinion. While the court failed to show why the quotations of the Jackson case listed above are applicable to both assumpsit and trespass
actions, it did state that "the Jackson case is based soundly on justice." Thus, a
bailee-parking lot owner may be strictly liable in both tort and contract for the
conduct of his servant.
There are four possible theories under which a plaintiff could sue a baileeparking lot owner for injuries caused by the latter's servant. They are (1) that de2 Those authorities are Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel Inc., 162 Pa. Super. 271, at page 273, 57 A.2d
696, 697, (1948); 6 AM. JUR., BAILMENTS, § 266; WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 4, § 1065A,
page 2962; 6 AM. JUR., BAILMENTS, § 267; 57 C. J. S., MASTER AND SERVANT, § 570 e (1), page
314; 8 C. J. S., BAILMENTS, § 27 a (2), and SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE, §

158, page 372.
3 162 Pa. Super. 271, 57 A.2d 696, (1948).
4 n. 3.
5 Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 124 Pa. Super. 224, 188 A. 624, (1937).
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fendant is vicariously liable for the servant's torts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, (2) that he is liable for his own negligence with respect to the car by
violating his own legal duties, (3) that he is contractually liable for breach of an
implied promise to use reasonable care to keep the car safe, and (4) that he is
liable in tort for the negligent or wilful acts of the servant as if they were his
own since the duty arising from the status of bailment for hire,6 i. e. duty to use
reasonable care is non-delegable.
Under the first theory, the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master is liable
for torts committed by the servant while acting within the scope of authority or employment. 7 Closely related as the terms are, 8 they are usually defined as acts that
are means fairly adapted to accomplishing the master's purpose, including slight deviations by the employee. 9 If the servant's act comes within the definition, the master
is normally vicariously liable for the tort. 10 But, in the Metzger case, the court
announces that the servant acted outside of the scope of his employment. Therefore, in that case, the master (the bailee) cannot be held liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.

The second basis of an action could be that the bailee-master was negligent
himself. He may have failed to use reasonable care in the selection" or retention
of the servant.12 The defendant in the Metzger case was not found to be negligent
in any of these ways and therefore the decision does not consider this possibility.
The theory based on the contractual liability of the bailee-the third listed
above-springs from a maxim of contract law, i. 'e. that contractual rights are
assignable; contractual duties are not. 3 In order to find the parking lot owner
guilty of a breach of his contract, it is necessary to find an implied promise to use
reasonable care to keep the car safe. 14
Most of the parking lot cases, where recovery has been allowed for injuries
6 An arrangement such as that in the principal case is a bailment for hire. Baione v. Heavey, 103
Pa. Super. 529, 158 A. 181, (1932).
7 See Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Heinold, 60 F.2d 360, (1932); Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts 222,
(1835). For excellent discussion of the problem see SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE,
§§ 149-167, pages 350-402.
8 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE, §§ 153-159, pages 358-379.
9 See McFarlan v. Penna. R. R. Co., 199 Pa. 408, 49 A. 270, (1901). Also see RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY, § 228. There it is suggested that generally a servant's conduct is within the scope of
employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to perform, if it occurs substantially within
the authorized limits of time and space and if it is actuated at least in part by a purpose
to serve the master. PROSSER ON TORTS, Chapter 11, § 63, page 475-477 covers this point also.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 229, lists about ten circumstances to be considered in deciding whether
the servant was acting within the scope.
10 Underberg v. Stewart, 86 Pa. Super. 106, (1926).
11 Handley v. O'Gorman, 45 R. I. 242, 121 A. 399, (1923). In 15 A. L. R. 681 there is a discussion
of liability of parking lot owners.
12 For discussion see 10 MD. L. REV. 185 at 190. Also see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fawkes, 120
Minn. 350, 139 N.W. 703, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 331, (1913); 6 AM. JUR., BAILMENTS, § 265, page 371;
6 AM. JUR., BAILMENTS, § 267, page 374.
18 Pratt v. Martin, 183 Ark. 365, 35 S.W. 2d 1004, (1931); Corbett v. Smeraldo, 91 N.J.L. 29,
102 A. 889, (1918).
14 Phillips v. Int. Text Book Co., 26 Pa. Super. 230, (1904).
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caused by servants acting outside of the scope of their authority, have fallen within
this theory. This is true of cases arising in this 15 and other jurisdictions. 16
The final theory, (4) above, is that the master-bailee by virtue of the bailment itself has acquired a legal duty to use reasonable care which he cannot assign. This duty is distinct and separate from the duties arising from the contract
of bailment. 17 See Restatement of Agency, § 214. However, the result in
this situation, if such a duty exists, would be the same, at least from the standpoint of liability for acts of another. The master-bailee would be liable not only
for his own lack of due care with respect to the chattel, but also for the wrongful
acts of his servant outside the scope of the latter's employment. This duty would
arise from the bailment itself and would not be contractual in nature. The bailee
could be sued in trespass even though he was not negligent and even though the
8
acts of the servant were outside the scope of employment.'
That means that with facts like those in the Metzger case, if this theory is adopted by the Pennsylvania courts, the bailee-parking lot owner could be sued in

trespass. The Restatement of Agency, § 214, contains language which could be
interpreted as including the liability of the bailee arising from his status as a bailee
as well as that arising from the contract. Two Pennsylvania cases are cited in the
Pennsylvania Citations to the Restatement of Agency, § 214, as authority for the

proposition that the duty of a bailee for hire is non-delegable. 19 Neither case,
however, can be fairly interpreted as holding that the status of the bailee alone,
as distinguished from his contractual status, gives rise to non-delegable duties.

Looking back at the possible theories of recovery on facts such as those of
the Metzger case, it is obvious that only two could feasibly be used. The view
15 Vannatta v. Tolliver, 82 Pa. Super. 546, (1924) ; Underberg v. Stewart, n. 10.
16 Pratt v. Martin, n. 13; Corbett v. Smeraldo, n. 13; McClain v. The Automobile Co., 72 W. Va.
728, 79 S.E. 731, 48 L.R.A.N.S. 561, (1913); Evans v. Williams, 232 I1. App. 439, (1924); Employers F. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated and Sales Co., 85 Ind. App. 674, 155 N.E. 533, (1927). For complete treatment of the subject see 52 A.L.R. 711, 42 A.L.R. 135, 15 A.L.R. 681 and 65 A.L.R. 432.
HUDDY ON AUTOMOBILE LAW, Ninth Edition, Volumns 11-12, § 364, page 447, declares that the
duty of the bailee is contractual in nature in those cases where he is sued for the wrongful conduct
of the servant for the latter's acts outside of the scope of employment and where he (the bailee)
has not been negligent in selection or retention fo the former. In § 366 of the same work, the
issue is outlined as follows:
"Any negligence or unfaithfulness of the employee in protecting the property consticuting
a breach of the contract of bailment is chargeable to the bailee who can be made to respond in
damages caused thereby. The rule, it is said, does not involve the master's responsibility for the
tortious act of his servant. It involves rather the question of the master's liability for breach of his
own contract." Cf. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Schreiber, 150 Wis., 42, 135 N.W. 507, 45 L.R.A.N.S
314, (1912). There the majority of the court did not see the justice in the contract theory.
17 See PROSSER ON TORTS, Chapter 5, § 33, pages 201-205.
18 "It has never been held that the master is liable for the torts of his servant without the course
of his employment." Firestone Tire and Rub. Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 120 Wash 665, 208 P.
55, 26 A.L.R. 217, (1922). Also see 15 A.L.R. 2d 846, (that a bailee is "not liable in tort for
the theft of property by his servant in absence of negligence on the part of the former" or unless
within scope of servant's employment.)
19 Cases cited there are Vannatta v. Tolliver, n. 15, and Caplan v. Ebel, 73 Pa. Super. 601,
(1920). The first case was an action in assumpsit like the Metzger case and the result there was
within theory (3) above. See n. 15 and n. 16. The Caplan case was based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior and likewise is not authority for the proposition set forth by the Jackson decision.
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based on contractual liability is sound and was accepted as the basis of the Metzger
decision. The last basis of recovery, the non-delegable duty theory, may or may
not be valid. The Jackson case, 20 cited by the court in the Metzger decision, and
one other Pennsylvania case can be interpreted as upholding the latter theory.
The facts of the Jackson case are these. Defendant left his servant in charge
of his parking lot. The servant desiring to leave early left another man, one
Yermoska, in charge. Yermoska was not an employee of defendant. Plaintiff took
his car to the lot, paid the required consideration, received the customary receipt
and left the car with Yermoska, believing the latter to be defendant's employee.
The plaintiff sued the defendant-bailee for injury to the car inflicted by Yermoska.
After deciding that Yermoska was defendant's employee, 21 the court found that
defendant was under "an absolute duty to use ordinary care" and that he had
violated that duty.
The court in its opinion quoted from Shearman and Redfield on Negligence,
§ 158, page 372. The opinion, after stating the general rule as to a master's liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior continued:
"When not so done (i. e. not done within the scope of the servant's employment), yet if they directly cause a failure to perform a duty incumbent upon
the master, he is responsible."
One further quotation from the case will serve to point out this new trend iai
bailment liability of parking lot owners in Pennsylvania.
"If the defendant was under an absolute duty as to the bailed car, it
makes no difference whether the defendant's own servant wrongfully
took the car and injured it, or whether the defendant failed properly to
guard against a third party doing so. The bailee's liability is predicated,
not on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but upon an absolute duty to
use ordinary care to prevent the car being taken. 22
Since the action was in trespass in Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc.,23 it would
seem that the bailee of a car, simply because of his status as a bailee, has a legal
duty which is just as strict, as absolute and as non-delegable as his contractual duty
24
to use ordinary care.
The court cited with approval Vannatta v. Tolliver.2 5 This case, however, was
a contract action.2 6 Subtly the court hints that defendant was negligent in hiring
20 n. 3.
21 The case has been the subject of previous law review comment. See 10 Pir.
L. REV. 88 for discussion of the agency question centering around the court's decision that Yermoska was defendant's
employee.
22 Cf. Dietrich v. Peters, 28 Ohio. App. 427, 162 N.E. 753, (1928).
23 n. 3.
24 Previously such non-delegable duties had been generally confined to the following situations: (1)
highly dangerous activities, (2) occupiers of land, (3) contractual relationships or legally imposed
duties on persons voluntarily entering into certain relationships, e.g. carrier's duty to its passengers
and (4) public utilities. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 214. For further discussion see SI-IEARMAN
AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE, § 157, page 372.
25 n. 15.
26 n. 19.
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and retaining the servant involved. 2 7 Yet this point was apparently not put in issue.
The decision also stated that defendant was liable for breach of duty since a valid
contract existed. Does this mean that the duty would not exist on a Sunday? What
would the situation be if the bailee was a minor or a person otherwise lacking
full contractual capacity? It would seem that, since a bailment for hire gives rise to
a legal duty to use due care, it would not matter on which day of the week the
transaction took place or what the capacity of the bailee was.
One other case, Smith v. Cohen,2 8 also a trespass action, apparently sets forth
this doctrine. That opinion declared that the garage owner failed to use due care by
failing to prevent the taking of plaintiff's car. The criminal act, the taking, was
foreseeable, said the court. The servant's failure to prevent the taking was deemed
to be an act of the master and the result reached was similar to that in the lackso,
case. The case might also be interpreted as falling within the respondeat superior
doctrine, however.
A different, but less compelling, explanation can be found which would
support the non-delegable legal duty theory seemingly established by Jackson v.
Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc. 29 That explanation is found in 6 Am. Jur., Bailments, § 266,

and is quoted in part in the Metzger decision.
It is there suggested that "it probably does no violence to regard the bailee
as liable for an employee's torts (in such cases) which violate some duty of the
bailment, the performance of which was at the time intrusted to such employee, on
the theory that such acts are within the general scope of his employment." Such
a view, however, would do violence to the doctrine of respondeat superior. "Scope
of employment" would mean that the employer would be liable for all the servant's acts while at work no matter how great the deviation from the master's
business. The Superior Court has found such an interpretation to be unwise in the
80
past.
A more practical argument supporting the result in the Jackson case has
been advanced in an English case, Coupe Co. v. Maddock.8 1 It was there stated
that the conclusion should be reached on general principles as to the public benefit.
Where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss arising from the misconduct of a third party, it is to the public's advantage that the loss should fall in
such a way as to diminish the probability of recurrence of the happening, the
opinion stated.
27 The court said: "That the person selected was unworthy is the fault of the defendant and
not the plaintiff."
28 116 Pa. Super. 395, 176 A. 869, (1935). See Hare v. Mulligan, 77 Pa. Super. 577, (1921),
where court by way of dictum intimates that legal duty arising out of the status of bailee for which
the bailee may be sued in tort may be increased by special contract.
29 n. 3.

30 MacPhail v. Pinkertons Nat. Detective Agency, 134 Pa. Super. 351, 3 A.2d 968, (1939);
Guille v. Campbell, 200 Pa. 119, 49 A. 938, 55 L.R.A. 111, (1901).
81 2 Q.B. 413 (1891).
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What then is the situation in Pennsylvania? It is this. When a bailor delivers his
car to a bailee or his servant, pays the required consideration and in return
receives the customary receipt, the bailee will be liable for any damage to or
loss of the car caused by his own acts or those of his servant. And this rule applies
even though the servant was acting outside the scope of his authority. According
to Metzger v. Downton Garage Corp.,32 other Pennsylvania cases88 and the
weight of authority in other states,8 4 the liability may be predicated on the bailee's
breach of his contractual obligation. An action of this type would necessarily be
brought in assumpsit in this Commonwealth.
The bailor-car owner could also sue in trespass upon the theory that the bailment duty to use reasonable care was non-delegable. Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc.'5
and Smith v. Cohen36 have apparently established such a rule. 8 7 It would seem
then that Pennsylvania is joining other jurisdictions in creating vicarious liability
beyond the scope of employment.
Roger D. Mulhollen

AGENCY-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT OR MASTER AND SERVANT
Chalupiak, the plaintiff in a recent case,' purchased a tract of land from
the County Commissioners. Ht intended to purchase the specific tract which was
assessed as the "land of James Moore Heirs." This tract was not described by metes
and bounds but it consisted of approximately 54 acres. The plaintiff hired a registered engineer to prepare a survey and plan of this tract and he had the title thereto
examined and approved by a lawyer. The survey and plan was inaccurate since it
included therein some 30 acres of land which plaintiff did not own. Chalupiak,
whom the court described as unlettered, believed he owned 80 acres of land. Armed
with the erroneous survey and plan and his lawyer's approval plaintiff divided the
entire tract into building lots and went to the office of the defendant to have him
prepare a deed for one of the lots. The defendant Stahlman was a justice of the
peace and a tax collector in addition to regular employment in a nearby factory.
82 n. 1.

88 n. 15.
84 n. 16.
85 n. 3.
86 n. 28.

87 The possibility of attaching mental distress and other parasitic claims to such an action in tort is be.
yond the scope of the discussion here. Space also will not allow consideration of other difficulties that
could arise if the theory here is extended generally to other bailment transactions. Parking lot cases
alone have been treated here, but other types of bailment situations have been the subject of cases
decided under this theory. The extent to which the theory has been enlarged and the instances
in which it has been applied are discussed in 45 HARV. L. REv. 342. Also see 15 A.L.R. 2d 846.
88 An excellent article on this more general problem can be found in 45 HARV. L. REv. 342.
1 Chalupiak v. Stahlman, 368 Pa. 83.
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receives the customary receipt, the bailee will be liable for any damage to or
loss of the car caused by his own acts or those of his servant. And this rule applies
even though the servant was acting outside the scope of his authority. According
to Metzger v. Downton Garage Corp.,32 other Pennsylvania cases88 and the
weight of authority in other states,8 4 the liability may be predicated on the bailee's
breach of his contractual obligation. An action of this type would necessarily be
brought in assumpsit in this Commonwealth.
The bailor-car owner could also sue in trespass upon the theory that the bailment duty to use reasonable care was non-delegable. Jackson v. Ft. Pitt Hotel, Inc.'5
and Smith v. Cohen36 have apparently established such a rule. 8 7 It would seem
then that Pennsylvania is joining other jurisdictions in creating vicarious liability
beyond the scope of employment.
Roger D. Mulhollen

AGENCY-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT OR MASTER AND SERVANT
Chalupiak, the plaintiff in a recent case,' purchased a tract of land from
the County Commissioners. Ht intended to purchase the specific tract which was
assessed as the "land of James Moore Heirs." This tract was not described by metes
and bounds but it consisted of approximately 54 acres. The plaintiff hired a registered engineer to prepare a survey and plan of this tract and he had the title thereto
examined and approved by a lawyer. The survey and plan was inaccurate since it
included therein some 30 acres of land which plaintiff did not own. Chalupiak,
whom the court described as unlettered, believed he owned 80 acres of land. Armed
with the erroneous survey and plan and his lawyer's approval plaintiff divided the
entire tract into building lots and went to the office of the defendant to have him
prepare a deed for one of the lots. The defendant Stahlman was a justice of the
peace and a tax collector in addition to regular employment in a nearby factory.
82 n. 1.

88 n. 15.
84 n. 16.
85 n. 3.
86 n. 28.

87 The possibility of attaching mental distress and other parasitic claims to such an action in tort is be.
yond the scope of the discussion here. Space also will not allow consideration of other difficulties that
could arise if the theory here is extended generally to other bailment transactions. Parking lot cases
alone have been treated here, but other types of bailment situations have been the subject of cases
decided under this theory. The extent to which the theory has been enlarged and the instances
in which it has been applied are discussed in 45 HARV. L. REv. 342. Also see 15 A.L.R. 2d 846.
88 An excellent article on this more general problem can be found in 45 HARV. L. REv. 342.
1 Chalupiak v. Stahlman, 368 Pa. 83.
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He drew wills, contracts and other papers for a fee for the people who lived in
that community.
The defendant examined the erroneous survey and plan and asked plaintiff
if he was sure he owned the ground. Plaintiff told defendant that his engineer
and lawyer informed him that he had good title. This particular deed was not
drawn up at this time and an attorney prepared the deed at a later date. Subsequently,
however, the defendant prepared 4 other deeds for the plaintiff from the engineer's
survey. Some of the land conveyed by these deeds was not owned by Chalupiak.
Defendant was paid $18.00 for the preparation of these deeds.
About a year later the plaintiff went to the defendant's office to have him
acknowledge a petition to the commissioners to validate plaintiff's title to the tract
in question. At this time the defendant showed the plaintiff a borough map and
pointed out to him that the description of the land in the petition did not correspond
with the map which indicated that Chalupiak did not own all of the land described
in the petition. He then told plaintiff that the disputed tract of land was being
advertised for sale by the County Commissioners who owned it. Chalupiak again
ignored defendant's advice. The defendant found that the petition contained other
errors and it was not acknowledged by the defendant until four months later.
During the four month interval, the defendant, as an agent for his sister, purchased
the land in dispute, and when he finally did take the acknowledgement he did not
tell the plaintiff that he had bought the land.
Plaintiff upon learning these facts, brought a bill in equity to compel the
defendant to convey this land to the plaintiff. The Chancellor who heard the
testimony decided that the defendant "was not an agent for the plaintiff, in the
sale of any land, he had no dealings with any purchasers and he acted for plaintiffs
at their request, only in drawing the deeds and taking plaintiffs' acknowledgement
to the deeds." He further found that defendant had not acted in a fiduciary relationship and he dismissed the bill.
However, the Supreme Court upon appeal reversed the decision of the lower
court deciding that defendant had acted in an agency capacity, and out of this sprang
a confidential relationship upon which plaintiff relied to his detriment.
Justice Bell filed a very vigorous dissent stating that the majority had ignored
the Chancellor's finding of fact that the defendant was not an agent and that no
confidential relationship 'existed and stated that the majority had based their conclusions of law on "an erroneously assumed state of facts."
In the instant case the facts do not sustain a finding of an agency relationship
much less a confidential relationship. The Restatement 2 defines agency as "the
relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." The plaintiff requested the defendant to perform
2 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 1.

RECENT CASES

a service for him from information supplied by him and the defendant consented
to perform the service. The relationship was that of master and servant rather than
principal and agent. Justice Holmes in his edition of Kents Commentaries8 said:
"The distinction between a servant and an agent is the distinction between serving
and acting for."
In Mechem on Agency, 4 the distinction between a servant and agent is plainly
set out as follows:
"The characteristic of the agent is that he is a business representative. His function is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance
of, or terminate contractual obligations between his principals and third
persons. To the proper performance of his functions therefore, it is absolutely essential that there shall be third persons in contemplation
between whom and the principal, legal obligations are to be thus created,
modified or otherwise affected by the acts of the agent.
The function of the servant, on the other hand, as his name suggests, is the rendition of service,-not the creation of contractual obligations. He executes the commands of his master, chiefly in reference to
things, but occasionally with reference to persons when no contractual
obligation is to result.'
The defendant in this case was told to prepare a deed subject to the plaintiff's
commands from the erroneous survey and he was not permitted to use any discretion
with reference to the contents of the deed. His services were limited to seeing that
the deeds were in proper form.
The defendant's role in this case was actually that of a clerk or stenographer
who is hired to type a letter from dictation by the employer. The employer is not
interested in whether the stenographer approves of the letter's contents; he merely
expects the final draft to contain the message he dictated whether right or wrong
and he expects it to conform to the ordinary business form of a letter. From
the conduct of the plaintiff it is evident that he considered the defendant an amanuensis rather than an agent. And in the final anlysis it is the intent of the parties
which controls any relationship between them.
It may also be stated here that in order for an agency relationship to exist
there must be a manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf . . ."5 The plaintiff never in any way consented to the defendant's acting as his agent. On the contrary, he very clearly established by his
conduct that he considered the defendant a mere servant. He repeatedly refused
to heed defendant's gratuitous offers of advice and told the defendant that he was
acting on the advice of his counsel and engineer.
The rules affecting the master-servant relationship do not differ in any great
degree from that of prinicpal-agent. The servant also has a duty to be loyal, to be
3

KENTS COMMENTARIES, Vol. II, page 260 note.
4 Vol. 1, § 36, pages 21 and 22.
5 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 1.
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careful and to account to his master. 6 However, the scope of the servant's duty is
not so broad. He ordinarily is not the repository of confidential information to
the extent that an agent is and his duty of loyalty is determined by the amount
of confidence reposed in him. In this case the Supreme Court intimated that if
one acting in a simple clerical capacity had acquired the same knowledge as the
defendant and had acted upon it as did the defendant, he would have breached no
duty of loyalty because no confidential relationship would have existed. An agent
is a fiduciary only with respect to matters within the scope of his agency. 7
The Chancellor in the Court below found as a fact that the defendant was
not an agent or a confidential advisor. It is a fundamental principle of law in Pennsylvania that the findings of fact made by the Chancellor in Equity who has judged
the credibility of witnesses have the force and effect of a jury verdict and will not
be disturbed by the appellate court where there is adequate 'evidence to support
them. 8 The Supreme Court treated the Chancellor's findings of fact as an incorrect conclusion of law rather than as a finding of fact. There certainly was adequate
evidence to support the Chancellor's finding of fact as to agency as we have hereinbefore set forth and the appelate court should not have set his finding aside.
After having decided that an agency relationship existed, the Supreme Court
went one step further and found that a confidential relationship also existed. They
based this finding on the fact that the plaintiff was an unlettered man who relied
upon the defendant in this business dealing. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The plaintiff may have been "unlettered" but he certainly was not stupid
as evidenced by the large scale building development he planned. He was a shrewd
businessman who secured professional assistance when he considered it necessary.
The plaintiff did not rely upon the defendant's advice but forthrightly rejected it.
He not only refused to heed the defendant's advice, he indicated how little faith
he reposed in defendant's judgment by failing to have a re-check of the survey
and title made by the engineer and his lawyers to reassure himself of the validity
of his title.
Even assuming for the purposes of argument that an agency relationship did
exist here, nevertheless it does not necessarily follow that a confidential relationship
also existed. Our Supreme Court has said that it does not ordinarily exist "and proof
of the fact of confidence reposed must necessarily be much stronger than in other
relations . . ."9 In order for the confidential relationship to exist a relation of
dependency on one side and domination on the other must be evident plus a factual situation which indicates that the person harmed did not exercise ordinary
vigilance because of some peculiar personal or business relationship between the
6 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 429.
7 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 13.

8 See Kees, Excr. v. Green, 365 Pa. 368 75 A.2d 602; Deal's Estate, 321 Pa. 484, 184 A. 453;
Homan v. Donaldson, 331 Pa. 388, 200 A. 30; Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 136, 8 A.2d 42;
Christy v. Christy, 353 Pa. 476, 46 A.2d 169; Roth v. Harte, 365 Pa. 428, 75 A.2d 583; Barrett v.
Heiner, 367 Pa. 510, 80 A.2d 729.
9 Grace v. Moll, 285 Pa. 353, 132 A. 171.
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parties which lulled him into a feeling of false security. 10 There is nothing in the
factual situation here which would lead anyone to believe that the plaintiff reposed
any faith in the defendant. The plaintiff's failure to b'e vigilant and subsequent
injury in the case before us came about not as a result of faith reposed but of faith
unreposed in defendant. The lack of vigilance and the injury which resulted to the
plaintiff stemmed from his reliance upon his own attorney and engineer whom he
believed had superior knowledge.
An astute reader of the opinion may feel that the real basis for the court's
holding is evident from its dictum which is to the effect that since the defendant
usurped the functions of a lawyer in this and other dealings with the plaintiff and
his neighbors that he should be visited with the duties and liabilities of a lawyerclient relationship. However, in this isolated dealing with the plaintiff, the facts do
not warrant such an inference.
It is well and good that our courts of justice desire to protect the interests of
persons who have been outwitted or out-maneuvered by persons in whom they
have reposed confidence. However, if the interest of the individual sought to be
protected is one which is susceptible of legal redress, our courts should base its relief on a sound principle of law rather than resorting to legal prestidigitation.
Lord Coke aptly said: "The knowne certaintie of the law is the saftie of man."
Mary Alice Duffy

CRIMINAL LAW-DURESS PER MINAS
WALTER
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In D'Aquino v. U. S.1 the defendant was indicted for treason. The alleged
treasonable conduct was broadcasting, in Japan, with intent to aid the enemies of
the United States. One of the defenses was duress per minas, or compulsion by
threats, which the court referred to variously as coercion, compulsion, or necessity.
The trial court instructed the jury that "in order to excuse a criminal act"
on the ground of coercion, compulsion or necessity, one must have acted under the
apprehension of immediate and impending death or of serious and immediate bodily
harm." The Circuit Court said that this was "a correct statement of the law."
10 97 U. OF PA. LAW REVIEw 712.
*B.L., University of Virginia Law School, 1905; D.C.L., Dickinson College, 1932; LL.D., Saint
Francis College, 1932; LL.D., Muhlenberg College, 1939; LL.D., Albright College, 1943; Professor,
Dickinson School of Law, 1906-; Dean, Dickinson School of Law, 1930-; Chairman, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 1939-40; Editor, Statutory Law of Pennsylvania, 1919-22; Chairman,
Alien Enemy Hearing Board, U. S. Department of Justice, 1941-; Members American and Pennsylvania Bar Associations; Author, HITCHLER ON CRIMES.
1 192 F. 2nd. 338.
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The defendant contended that "however correct the instruction might be in
and ordinary cage where a person accused of crime committed in his own country
claims to have been coerced by an individual, the instruction of the court was in
error in the requirement of apprehension of immediate and impending death or
immediate bodily harm, in a case where the accused person was in an enemy country,
unable to get protection from the United States, and where the compulsion is on
the part of the alien government itself."
The Circuit Court said, "we think that under the circumstances here there
was no occasion for departing from the ordinary rules applicable to the defenses of
duress and coercion.
"We know of no rule that would permit one who is under the protection of
an enemy to claim immunity from prosecution for treason merely by setting up a
claim of mental fear of possible future action on the part of the enemy. We think
that the citizen owing allegiance to the United States must manifest a determination
to resist commands and orders until such time as he is faced with the alternative
of immediate injury or death. Were any other rule to be applied, traitors in the
enemy country would by that fact alone be shielded from any requirement of
resistence. The person claiming the defense of coercion and duress must be a
person whose resistance has brought him to the last ditch."
The general rule is that duress is a defense only where the evil threatened is
"present, imminent and impending."2
It is said that this rule is grounded on sound reason and enlightened justice,
and a contrary rule would be monstrous and unjust. An analogue is found in the
law of self-defense. "If the right of self-defense and forcible resistance against
an aggressor exists only in the presence of imminent danger or when an offense is
about to be committed, it would be an anomalous condition of the law that would
justify or excuse the commission of a felony against the person or property of an
entirely innocent person because the person doing the deed had reason to fear
and did fear, not an imminent and immediate danger * * * but a future and remote danger and one that in the very nature of things could be averted by innocent
methods." 8
The reason for the rule is asserted to be that unless the danger is imminent and
impending the defendant has the power to protect himself from it and can appeal to
to the law for protection.
The rule was therefore very properly relaxed in a Kentucky case. 4 It appeared
that night riding had been going on in the country and a highly excited condition
prevailed; that the civil authorities were, in many instances, wholly unable to
preserve order and prevent acts of violence and lawlessness and the destruction of
property; and that the local authorities, even when supplemented by the entire
2 Hitchler, CRIMINAL LAW, p. 111.

8 P. v. Martin 13 Col. App. 96, 108 P. 1034.
4 C. v. Reffitt 149 Ky. 300, 148 SW 48.
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military power of the state, were unable to restore order or prevent the perpetration
of gross outrages upon the persons and property of those antagonistic to the success of the night riders. It was properly held that a crime committed under a fear
of injury inspired by threats of the night riders was excused even though the danger
was not imminent and impending at the time of the commission of the crime.
The contention of the defendant in the instant case seems to come within this
principle. The decisions may, perhaps, have been influenced by the character of
the crime involved. In the Kentucky case the crime was "selling pool tobacco."
In the instant case it was treason, which Blackstone says is "the highest crime a man
can possibly commit." 5
The doctrine, announced in a recent English treason case, that duress whether
it is available as a defense under the general rule or not, may be a defense where the
defendant is charged with a crime involving a particular intent, seems to have been
overlooked.6
5 4 Comm. 75.
6 Rex v. Shane K. B. (1947)
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